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ABSTRACT 
The activity of private investigations by fraud examiners is a business of lawyers, auditors and 
other professionals who investigate suspicions of financial crime by white-collar criminals. 
This article presents results from an empirical study of investigation reports. The available 
sample consists of 21 report produced mostly by auditing firms such as PwC. Suspicion of 
financial crime led to police investigation, public prosecution and jail sentence in two cases.  
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Introduction 
Financial crime investigation is a growing business area for law firms, auditing firms, 
consulting firms and other professional service firms. Financial crime specialists in these 
firms are investigation suspicions of corruption, insider trading, embezzlement, tax evasion 
and other kinds of financial crime. Their clients are organizations wanting to investigate facts, 
causes and responsibilities for an incident or general misconduct. Financial crime specialists 
apply intelligence, investigation, examination, analysis and hypotheses to establish facts. 
They perform fact finding, causality study, change study and suspect identification (Machen 
and Richards, 2004; Morgan and Nix, 2003; Wells, 2003). 
The purpose of this article is to present results from an exploratory study of private 
investigations by fraud examiners in Norway. Specifically, the purpose of this article is to 
present results for a study of investigation reports produced by law firms, auditing firms and 
other firms for clients in both the private and public sector.  
This research is important, as the business of private investigations is both challenging and 
supporting police work. It is challenging police work, as evidence can be harmed and 
prosecution of criminal offences can be carried out by private actors rather than public 
authorities. Private investigations can sometimes challenge the rule of law by taking on all 
three roles of police investigator, public prosecutor, and court judge. It is a danger of 
privatization of court settlement between the community and the criminal.  
On the other hand, private investigations can support police work by confirming or 
disconfirming suspicions of financial crime. Private and public organizations pay the bills 
from professional service firms to establish the facts.   
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 Financial Crime Specialists 
In the UK, the Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists (ACFS) was created to 
respond to a growing need for documented, verifiable and certifiable knowledge and skill in 
the financial crime field and to meet the career development needs of the diverse and growing 
number of specialists in the private and public sectors who work in this field. 
A private investigation is conducted by a variety of private sector financial crime specialists 
who can be investigators, forensic accountants, or lawyers, all whom may be supported by 
investigative analysts, who the government usually calls intelligence analysts.  
ACFS stresses the importance of the following fourteen topics for financial crime specialists: 
the challenge of financial crime; financial crime overview, commonalities and convergence; 
money laundering; understanding and preventing fraud; global anti-corruption compliance 
and enforcement; tax evasion and enforcement; asset recovery; financial crime investigations; 
interpreting financial documents; money and commodities flow; compliance programs and 
controls; data security and privacy; ethical responsibility and best practices; and international 
agreements and standards. 
In the US, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) was created for similar 
reasons as the ACFS in the UK. Becoming a certified fraud examiner requires documented 
academic and professional qualifications. Formal education in the fraud examination field is 
new and limited (Wells, 2003). The ACFE website (www.acfe.com) addresses the needs of 
ACFE members and also provides free resources to general public (Anders, 2006). Certified 
fraud examiners have ample career opportunities, since the CFE certification was created in 
response to the demand for expertise in fraud prevention and detection (Morgan and Nix, 
2003; Wells, 2003). 
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Fraud examiners in the US can have varying backgrounds. It is not only lawyers, auditors and 
consultants who work as private investigators. Sociologists and criminologists can also take 
on tasks as detectives. Examples are mentioned by Kennedy (2013), who writes about 
forensic sociology and criminology. Investigation by sociologists and criminologists might be 
concerned about people who have neglected responsibility, people who have abused their 
positions, or organizations where training and guidelines have been missing.  
Thus, fraud examiners encompass a wide array of professions, including auditors, 
accountants, fraud investigators, loss prevention specialists, attorneys, educators, sociologists 
and criminologists. While fraud examiners in the US can work independent, many are also 
member of the ACFE. Fraud examiners provide a broad range of services to businesses and 
governmental agencies as either employees or independent consultants (ACFE, 2008). A 
fraud examiner may assist in a fraud investigation by procuring evidence, taking statements, 
and writing reports (Machen and Richards, 2004). 
In balancing the twin goals of disinterestedness and reliability, Machen and Richards (2004) 
suggest that a company should consider the purpose of the investigation. Where the results are 
to be used in-house or where the company is simply establishing a fraud prevention system, 
there is less concern regarding credibility. Thus, a fraud examiner who has knowledge of the 
business may be a wiser choice in that instance because of such examiner’s familiarity with 
the company. In contrast, where information from the fraud investigation may be subject to 
scrutiny by those outside the company, the appearance of disinterestedness becomes more 
critical and the company should consider hiring an independent fraud examiner. 
Within the broad category of fraud examiners are forensic accountants who specialize in a 
unique brand of accounting that departs from the traditional methods employed in the 
accounting field (Machen and Richards, 2004). 
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Research Method 
The market for private financial crime investigations by fraud examiners has grown in 
Norway in recent years. Several reasons can be found for this growth. First, compliance by 
business organizations has become an important issue, especially for corporations trading 
their stocks on stock exchanges both domestically and abroad. Detecting and preventing 
financial crime has thus become critical. Second, suspicions of financial crime generally and 
white-collar crime in particular will harm business reputation, making it imperative to find out 
what actually happened. Third, Norwegian police does often not have the capacity and 
competence to investigate complicated business irregularities. Fourth, corporate social 
responsibility has become an issue on the board agenda in many organizations, where ethical 
guidelines, anti-bribery activities and other crime-related topics are of increasing importance. 
Finally, innocent yet suspected individuals, especially when exposed in the media, deserve a 
fair investigation to prove their innocence.  
Private investigations in Norway are carried out by auditing firms such as BDO, Deloitte, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PwC, as well as by law firms such as Kvale, Lynx and 
Wiersholm. Fraud examiners in these firms are typically trained as auditors, lawyers and 
police detectives. In a country of five million people, there are about one hundred partners and 
associates in these firms who have fraud investigations as their main occupation. In addition, 
larger banks, insurance firms, oil companies and other organizations have internal 
investigation departments.  
An estimated ten private investigations become publicly known in Norway per year. Out of 
this number, the current research was able to obtain twenty-one investigation reports from 
recent years. Access to most investigation reports was denied by the investigation contractor, 
the client, where typically the investigation took place. Based on the accessed investigation 
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reports, this article attempts to identify some characteristics of investigation reports listed in 
Table 1.  
 
# Case Investigator Suspicion  Pages 
1 Adecco 
Nursing and cleaning 
services business 
Wiersholm (2011) 
law firm 
Exploitation of work force in 
nursing home in terms of low 
wages and inhuman working 
hours 
22 
2 Ahus 
Public hospital 
PwC (2013a) 
auditing firm 
Buying expensive 
geographical information 
system services 
15 
3 Briskeby 
Football stadium 
Lynx (2011) law 
firm 
Over charging for 
construction work at football 
stadium 
267 
4 Eckbo 
Family foundation 
Dobrowen and 
Klepp (2009) law 
firm 
Executives in ideal 
foundation for personal gain 
119 
5 Fadderbarna 
NGO for children 
BDO (2011) 
auditing firm 
Excessive administration 
costs in NGO 
46 
6 Furuheim 
Church foundation 
Dalane and Olsen 
(2006) law firm 
Executives in church 
foundation for personal gain 
164 
7 Gassnova 
Carbon capture and 
storage 
BDO (2013) 
auditing firm 
Irregular procurement 
procedures by employees 
27 
8 Halden Ishall 
Sports Ice Arena 
KPMG (2012) 
auditing firm 
Excessive cost overrun in 
reconstruction 
121 
9 Langemyhr 
Construction company 
PwC (2008a) 
auditing firm 
Fraud by overbilling city 
work in hours 
26 
10 Lindeberg 
Nursing home 
Kommune-
revisjonen (2013) 
auditing service 
Outside authority of 
personnel 
92 
11 Lunde Group 
Transportation company 
Bie (2012) law 
firm 
Fraud and tax evasion for 30 
million US dollars 
86 
12 Moskvaskolen 
Norwegian school in 
Moskau 
Ernst & Young 
(2013) auditing 
firm 
Private living expenses for 
dean covered by school 
38 
13 Norges Fotballforbund 
Football association 
Lynx (2013) law 
firm 
Football players changing 
clubs without clubs paying 
transfer money 
48 
14 Norsk Tipping 
Public betting firm 
Deloitte (2010) 
auditing firm 
CEO got his house and 
property maintained for free 
61 
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by the firm 
15 Oslo Vei 
Road construction 
company 
Kvale (2013) law 
firm 
Chairman and CEO suspected 
of fraud after bankruptcy  
53 
16 Spania 
City of Oslo project in 
Spain 
PwC (2009) 
auditing firm 
Abuse of public money spent 
on friends in Spain to build a 
local hospital for Norwegians 
92 
17 Terra 
Cities investing in bonds 
PwC (2008b) 
auditing firm 
Outside authority of city 
management 
52 
18 Troms Kraft 
Power supply company 
Nergaard (2013) 
consulting firm 
Accounting manipulation in 
subsidiary and illegal political 
party support 
663 
19 Tyrkia 
City of Stavanger project 
for children 
PwC (2013b) 
auditing firm 
Smuggling of adopted 
children out of Turkey 
financed by the city of 
Stavanger 
14 
20 Undervisningsbygg 
School maintenance 
agency 
Kommune-
revisjonen 
(2006a, 2006b) 
auditing service 
Fraud by property managers 
in the City of Oslo 
36 
21 Verdibanken 
Religious bank 
Wiersholm (2012) 
law firm 
Investment fraud by bank 
executive 
5 
Table 1: Characteristics of reports from fraud examinations by private investigators 
 
First in Table 1, the case name is mentioned. Adecco is a business firm, Ahus is a public 
hospital, while Briskeby is a football stadium. Eckbo is a family foundation, Fadderbarna is a 
non-government organization for children care, while Furuheim is a church foundation 
running homes for elderly. Next in the table, literature reference to investigation reports is 
listed, using the investigating firm as reference. Suspicion causing the investigation is listed in 
the next column. Finally, the number of pages in the investigation report is listed. 
Making private investigation reports publicly known – as those listed in the table – serves a 
number of important purposes. Firstly, whistle-blowers receive the required recognition they 
deserve, and future whistle-blowers can observe that whistle-blowing matters. Next, published 
investigations can have a preventive effect on potential white-collar criminals and also make 
white-collar criminals terminate their criminal activities. Publishing enables practical focus 
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and attention to morale and ethics, where it becomes visible what is acceptable and what is 
not. Publishing increases the extent of organizational transparency. Publishing enables 
learning by other organizations that could have ended up in the same situation. When 
corruption scandals such as the one involving global fertilizer Yara was in the media for 
weeks and months, the public expects to learn about the truth. Publication can generally lead 
to new insights about causes of financial crime, and thereby increase awareness among 
decision makers in society. Finally, available investigation reports can help improve teaching 
and research at universities. Despite all these good reasons, most private investigations by 
fraud examiners lead to secrecy of reports. 
There are indeed many reasons why most investigation reports are kept a secret. Here are 
some of our findings from denial of insight into examination reports: 
1. Damage. The examination report contains business secrets which competitors might 
take advantage of, and thus cause damage to the business in its markets 
2. Confidentiality. Lawyers are subject to confidentiality similar to medical doctors and 
psychologists.  
3. Suspicion. Some investigation reports are very comprehensive and also describe 
circumstances for which the suspect was never prosecuted.  
4. Mistakes. Some investigation reports have serious flaws, mistakes and shortcomings.  
5. Accusations. The investigation report has a number of unfounded accusations against 
individual persons, who receive the blame, without being able to defend themselves.  
6. Unsuccessful. The private investigation by fraud examiners was unsuccessful and a 
failure. Investigators did not find answers to the questions that initiated the inquiry, 
and they did not solve problems as expected by the client.  
7. Misconduct. The private investigation was a failure, because investigators showed 
misconduct in their work.  
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8. Unreadable. Some private investigation reports are simply not readable.  
9. Disagreement. Among owners of the organization, there might have been agreement 
to conduct a private investigation, but agreement can be lacking afterwards concerning 
publication of the investigation report.  
10. Termination. Like all other kinds of projects, some investigation projects are 
terminated before completion. One reason for early termination is the lack of 
relevance to the organization. Another reason is that the project was premature. A 
third reason might be that the project went on in a completely wrong direction.  
11. Confidentiality. Many individuals have provided valuable and sensitive information to 
private detectives under the assumption and with the promise that their information 
will never be disclosed.  
12. Evidence. Sometimes, private investigations are followed by police investigations, 
which may or may not lead to prosecution and court ruling. If important evidence is 
leaked to the public, it can harm the court process, both for the prosecutor and for the 
defendant.  
13. Work. There is too much work in filing a complaint or case to the police. The police 
always asks for more information, more documents and more meetings. 
 
Some Case Studies 
All twenty-on investigation reports listed in the table were subject to case studies. Here are 
three examples to illustrate what the cases are about.  
 
THE ECKBO CASE 
Eckbo’s Legater is one of Norway’s largest publicly beneficial and philanthropic foundations. 
Norwegian registration authority responded in 2007 to information that emerged in 
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newspapers about the foundations management, where Finn Olaf Eckbo – a third generation 
Eckbo – received 600.000 US dollars annually to manage the foundations. This was much 
more than yearly paid out for good causes. 
Not only newspaper reports caused the registration authority to respond. An active anti-
corruption politician on the very left hand side in politics, Erling Folkvord, wrote about about 
the Eckbos foundations with the title “they got it both ways”. A number of influential people 
both in business and politics were linked to the foundations, according to the book, and they 
all benefited personally from the links. This is despite the mission statement of the 
foundations, which is to support good causes financially. 
Andersland (2008) found that the story was just so amazing that it would have been dismissed 
as pure robber story if it had not been so uncomfortable well documented. In short, the book is 
about how significant portions of foundation funds, earmarked for charitable purposes, was 
used and abused for exorbitant fees, loans and pensions to directors and business managers. 
The business manager for many years, Rolf Eckbo, was finally - in 1997 - sentenced to five 
years in prison for financial fraud, and deprived of the right to be a lawyer. 
After newpaper reports and the book by Folkvord et al. (2008), private fraud investigators 
Dobrowen, a lawyer, Klepp, an auditor, were hired. They wrote a report very different from 
Folkvord’s book. Although they found some signs of waste of funds, they found no 
misconduct or signs of criminal behavior. In their investigation, the investigators mainly 
studied documents handed over to them by foundation loyal persons, and they only 
interviewed foundation loyal individuals.  
Dobrowen and Klepp (2009) concluded their investigation with the following findings: 
• The organization of asset management in Eckbo Endowments is in the committee's 
view, in accordance with the requirements of the organization as required by law and 
the articles of incorporation.  
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• In the committee's view, the practice of asset management in the period in question 
occurred in a responsible manner and has thus been in line with the foundation act and 
statute requirements. 
 
THE LANGEMYHR CASE 
Private investigators found Harald Langemyhr guilty of fraud of 22 million Norwegian kroner 
(PwC 2008a). Police investigators found him guilty of fraud of 12 million Norwegian kroner 
(Foss, 2010). The district court of Oslo found him not guilty of fraud (Oslo tingrett, 2012b). 
The case against Langemyhr started when Norwegian Labour Inspection in 2008 suspected 
the construction company owner of misconduct and crime against the City of Oslo. Five years 
later, Langemyhr received a replacement of 20 million Norwegian kroner from the City of 
Oslo based on a new court order. Langemyhr suffered personally and socially for five long 
years. He was unable to start up his construction company again in 2014.  
What went wrong? Were the private investigators wrong, accession Langemyhr of large-scale 
fraud? Were police investigators wrong, maybe because they put too much reliance on the 
private investigation report? Or was the judge wrong, since Langemyhr was maybe guilty of 
fraud? We will never know. 
But we may argue that the private investigators jumped to conclusions based on price 
estimates for construction work not verified by more than one construction consultant.  
 
THE TYRKIA CASE 
Adopted children from Turkey were smuggled out and back to Norway. There were 
suspicions of several kinds of crime. First, the child care manager in the City of Stavanger, on 
the west coast of Norway, was suspected of misappropriation of city funds. Next, Norwegian 
lawyers were suspected of hiding money transactions on client accounts. Then, a private 
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Norwegian detective who helped get the children out of Turkey was suspected of both 
corruption and tax evasion. Finally, helpers in Turkey were suspected of being bribed. 
It all started in 2006, when two children were under the case and protection of city child care 
in Stavanger went with their Norwegian foster parents to Turkey on vacation. The children 
had been taken away from their Turkish parents who lived in Stavanger sometime earlier. 
While on vacation in Turkey, a Turkish court ruled that the children were not allowed to leave 
the country.  
After the foster parents had returned to Norway without the children, the child care manager 
in the City of Stavanger transferred half a million Norwegian kroner – about ninety thousand 
US dollars – to a client account in a law firm in Stavanger. The lawyers Nils Geir Vestvik and 
Atle Helljesen who received the money from child care manager Gunnar Toresen transferred 
the money to the bank account of the spouse of private detective Ola Thune. The intention for 
the irregular money transfer was both to hide tracks to Ola Thune and to pay Thune’s helpers 
in smuggling the two Norwegian-Turkish boys to Norway (Aas et al., 2013). 
Many years later, after considerable attention in the media, especially in the daily newspaper 
Stavanger Aftenblad the city control committee decided to initiate a private investigation by 
fraud examiners from law and auditing firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). The 
investigation was carried out examiners Kjell Richard Manskow, Helge Kvamme, Gunnar 
Holm Ringen, Pål Jæger-Pedersen, Hege Oftedal and Thor Dalhaug from PwC. They write in 
their report (PwC 2013b: 14): 
The fact that part of the amount of money transferred to the attorney Vestvik’s private 
account to a private account in the name of a spouse caregiver appears highly 
irregular. For this part of the money vouchers are missing that can document how the 
funds were allocated. 
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The investigators from PwC were able to trace money transactions, but they were not able to 
allocate responsibilities to individuals such as the city child care manager, attorneys or 
detective and wife. Investigators from PwC answered the how-question, but they did not 
answer who-question or why-question for money transfer. This might be because the mandate 
for the investigation was focused on transactions (PwC 2013b: 6): 
The control committee in Stavanger has decided to initiate an investigation of law firm 
Projure’s accounting and documentation for Stavanger municipality in connection 
with the payment of a one-time amount from Stavanger municipality to the law firm in 
2006 in connection with the so-called “Turkey case”. The purpose of the project will 
be to conduct an inquiry, in which one looks closely at the accounts relating to 
payment of an amount of 500.000 NOK from Stavanger municipality to law firm 
Projure with potential subcontractors, and clarify / provide documentation on what 
these funds were used for. 
The mandate thus focused on how-question and not who- or why- question. Thus the roles 
and responsibilities of actor such as Toresen (city), Vestvik and Helljesen (lawyers), as well 
as Thune (smuggler) and his wife (money) remained unclear. 
Investigators from PwC presented their report to the control committee in the fall of 2013. 
The committee decided to send the report to the local police. City politicians decided to close 
the case (Aas et al., 2013; Aas and Ergo, 2013; Berge, 2013; Grimen and Terjesen, 2013; 
Østebø et al., 2013). 
 
Research Findings 
As exploratory research, investigation reports can be studied along the time axis of (i) 
initiation (investigation start), (ii) work process (investigation procedure), (iii) work results 
(investigation findings), and (iv) consequence (investigation effects). An investigation report 
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should clearly state the initiation in terms of background and mandate, describe the 
investigation process, explain findings from the investigation, as well as suggest points for 
action. All reviewed twenty-one investigation reports satisfied these requirements, although to 
a varying degree.  
An obvious difference among reports in Table 1 is the length, ranging from 5 to 663 pages. 
This range does not only reflect investigation scope and work load in terms of dollars paid. 
Some private investigations are billed for less than one hundred thousand US dollars, while 
others cost the client several millions. Six Norwegian kroner is the equivalent of one US 
dollar, and the most expensive investigation did also produce the longest report. The 
investigation of utility company Troms Kraft did cost 44 million Norwegian kroner and 
resulted in a report of 663 pages. There is a correlation between money spent on an 
investigation and the final report length.  
Some expensive investigations result in a short report, with the argument that executives and 
other decision-makers are supposed to read it, not only look through it. For a busy executive, 
more than one hundred pages of reading are not always acceptable. Bie (2012) did a very 
thorough and probably also expensive examination of all firms belonging to the Lunde Group. 
Nevertheless, he shortened his report down to 86 pages.  
Out of 21 available reports, 12 were produced by auditing firms, 8 by law firms and 1 by a 
consulting firm. The average length of auditing firm reports is 52 pages. The average length 
of law firm reports is 95 pages. Although not statistically significant, this difference is 
interesting in the sense that lawyers tend to put more emphasis on formality and procedure, 
while auditors tend to put more emphasis on findings, thereby potentially producing 
somewhat shorter reports.  
Three private investigation reports triggered later police investigations followed by public 
prosecution. In two cases, suspects were convicted to prison. The third case was dismissed 
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from court, which is the Langemyhr case described above. A report of only 26 pages (PwC 
2008a) was the basis for police investigation and public prosecution in court for several 
weeks, but the judge criticized the investigation and declared Langemyhr not guilty.  
A total of 11 individuals were sentenced to prison after Kommunerevisjonen (2006a, 2006b) 
public auditing service had investigated fraud by property managers in the City of Oslo. Two 
persons were sentenced to prison after Bie (2012) in law firm Vierdal had investigated fraud 
in a myriad of companies in the Lunde Group.   
Theory enables private investigators to create an overview over complexities in the real world 
by offering a verbal tool to organize a common and consistent understanding of reality 
(Colquitt og Zapata-Phelan, 2007): 
A theory might be a prediction or explanation, a set of interrelated constructs, 
definitions, and propositions that presents a systematic view of phenomena by 
specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining natural 
phenomena.  
Investigators formulate hypotheses about what might have happened. Hypotheses represent 
assumptions about occurrences and assumptions about connections and cause-and-effect 
relationships. A hypothesis is an untested view of reality, a possible explanation of a 
phenomenon. Did investigators in our case studies formulate and discuss competing 
hypothesis in their reports? As suggested by Brightman (2009), competing hypotheses 
represent analysis characterized by thorough examination of alternatives, identification of key 
bits of data that carry the most diagnostic weight, and painstaking attention to refuting 
hypotheses. 
In the investigation of the Norwegian Football Association conducted by Lynx (2013), the 
following alternative hypotheses for crime categories were formulated: 
1. Risks of misconduct in terms of abuse of funds in football clubs. 
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2. Risks of criminal behavior by participation in corruption when buying players. 
3. Risks of criminal behavior by participation in corruption when selling players. 
4. Risks of embezzlement, kick-backs and abuse of funds. 
5. Risks of misleading accounting of costs when buying players. 
6. Risks of misleading accounting and taxation of income for foreign players. 
7. Risks of breaching rules when compensating trainers and reporting trainers’ 
compensation. 
These seven hypotheses are alternatives for evidence collected in the investigation. 
Significant evidence and arguments include not only the facts known, but also the opinions 
and points of view from analysts on the case and other experts. This type of evidence may 
result in further critical questioning about what one might expect to be seeing if, in fact, the 
evidence or opinion presented is indeed true (Brightman, 2009). 
 
Conclusion 
This exploratory research has introduced the empirical side of private financial crime 
investigations and fraud examinations. More empirical material is needed to be able to 
conduct research in terms of hypotheses testing and validation. Contents analysis of 
investigation reports needs to rely on multiple raters based on criteria for classification of 
verbatim findings in reports.  
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